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Nancy J.  King 
 
Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez   
abstract.  This Essay argues that the Court’s effort to expand habeas review of ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims in Martinez v. Ryan will make little difference in either the 
enforcement of the right to the effective assistance of counsel or the provision of competent 
representation in state criminal cases.  Drawing upon statistics about habeas litigation and 
emerging case law, the Essay first explains why Martinez is not likely to lead to more federal 
habeas grants of relief. It then presents new empirical information about state postconviction 
review (cases filed, counsel, hearings, and relief rates), post-Martinez decisions, and anecdotal 
reports from the states to explain why, even if federal habeas grants increase, state courts and 
legislatures are unlikely to respond by invigorating state collateral review. The Essay concludes 
that alternative means, other than case-by-case postconviction review, will be needed to ensure 
the provision of effective assistance. 
 
author. Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. 
My thanks to Selah Lodge for her assistance with research for this Essay.  
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introduction 
 Last Term the Supreme Court unexpectedly expanded postconviction 
review of claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in three decisions: 
Martinez v. Ryan,1 Lafler v. Cooper,2 and Missouri v. Frye.3 In Martinez, the Court 
announced a new equitable rule for federal habeas corpus cases, allowing 
merits review of a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that 
was not addressed during a petitioner’s attack on his conviction or sentence in 
state court, if the petitioner lacked the effective assistance of counsel to raise it 
there.4 In Lafler and Frye, the Court enlarged the definition of ineffective 
assistance itself, declaring that bad advice during plea negotiations can amount 
to ineffective assistance if it deprives the defendant of a favorable plea deal,5 
allowing more petitioners than ever before to raise a ineffectiveness challenge 
to their convictions in state postconviction and federal habeas proceedings.  
 All three cases have attracted attention, but this Essay addresses the 
consequences of Martinez in particular. Commentators have documented how 
feeble postconviction review has turned out to be in ensuring competent 
representation.6 Some hope that the Martinez ruling will increase federal 
oversight of effective assistance in the states and enhance procedural 
protections in state postconviction review.7 Justices Scalia and Thomas 
predicted in dissent that the decision would leave states no choice but to 
 
 
1. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).  
2. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).  
3. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).  
4. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320. 
5. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410-11; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1390-91. 
6. E.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the 
Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 YALE. L.J. 2604, 2608-11 (2013). 
7. See, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines in Capital State Post-Conviction 
Proceedings After Martinez and Pinholster, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Primus, 
supra note 6, at 2607 (characterizing Martinez as “the first step down a path toward 
reinvigorating Gideon”); Gray R. Proctor, Habeas Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 After 
Martinez v. Ryan: Federalization and Forum Shopping for Ineffective-Assistance Claims, 92 
Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 279 (Dec. 5, 2012) (concluding that Martinez “clearly helps” federal 
habeas petitioners and “very likely . . . will prove to be more important than” other recent 
right-to-counsel cases); Mary Schmid Mergler, Supreme Court Sets Critical New Precedents on 
Right to Counsel, ACSBLOG (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/supreme-court 
-sets-critical-new-precedents-on-right-to-counsel. 
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appoint counsel for all indigent petitioners in postconviction proceedings.8 
Others have warned that states may eliminate state postconviction review 
rather than take that step.9 In this Essay I question these predictions and argue 
that the Court’s effort to expand habeas review of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims in Martinez will make little difference in either the enforcement 
of the right to the effective assistance of counsel or the provision of competent 
representation in state criminal cases.  
Drawing upon statistics about habeas litigation and emerging case law, 
Part I explains why Martinez is not likely to lead to more federal habeas grants 
of relief. Using new empirical information about state postconviction review, 
as well as post-Martinez decisions and anecdotal reports from the states, Part II 
further explains why, even if federal habeas grants increase, state courts and 
legislatures are unlikely to respond by invigorating state collateral review. The 
Conclusion argues that the limitations of postconviction review as a regulatory 
approach suggest the need to consider alternatives.  
i .   martinez  and federal habeas review 
The rule in Martinez is not likely to raise the notoriously low rate of relief in 
federal habeas. Before Martinez was decided, less than 1% of noncapital habeas 
petitions were granted for any claim.10 This is unlikely to change after Martinez 
 
 
8. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1327 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
9. Brief for the States of Wisconsin et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 36 n.22, 
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 10-1001), 2011 WL 4072899 at *36 (urging the Court not to 
“articulate a rule that would encourage a State to curtail an avenue of review that it might 
otherwise make available to its citizens in order to thwart meddling by the federal courts 
that undermine the finality of state court decisions”). 
10. See Nancy J. King, Non-Capital Habeas Cases After Appellate Review: An Empirical Analysis, 24 
FED. SENT’G REP. 308, 310 (2012) (reporting final outcomes of more than 2,300 randomly 
selected federal habeas cases from among those filed nationwide by state prisoners in 2003 
and 2004). Even though an estimated half of the study cases raised some sort of 
ineffectiveness claim, see NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, FINAL 
TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND 
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996 (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants 
/219559.pdf, in only two of those cases did a court eventually grant relief for the ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, see King, supra, at 315. 
A survey of even more recent cases from Michigan confirms just how rarely ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel (IATC) claims raised by state prisoners succeed. The Attorney 
General’s Office reported that of the 3,605 federal habeas petitions that it defended in the 
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for two reasons: few additional petitioners will receive merits review, and those 
that do remain unlikely to win.  
Martinez expands only slightly a narrow exception to the “state procedural 
default” doctrine, which generally requires a federal court to dismiss, without 
addressing the merits, any constitutional claim that a state court has refused to 
address because of the petitioner’s failure to comply with state rules.11 Martinez 
allows a federal court to reach the merits of such “defaulted” claims, but only if 
the claim alleges the ineffective assistance of trial counsel (IATC), is 
“substantial,” and was raised improperly or not at all in the petitioner’s initial 
collateral review proceeding in state court.12 But the exception is narrow 
indeed. As lower court decisions applying Martinez demonstrate, if a 
																																																																																																																																																			
six-year period from 2005 to 2010, only 100 were granted by federal district courts for any 
claim. Letter from Joel D. McGormley, Div. Chief, Appellate Div., Mich. Dep’t of Att’y 
Gen., to Ronald J. Schafer, Ionia Cnty. Prosecuting Att’y 3-4 (Jan. 23, 2012) (on file with 
author). Only 45 of those grants were for an IATC claim, at least 17 of which were reversed 
by the federal courts of appeals. Id. Federal judges, in other words, granted relief to 
approximately 1.3% of habeas petitioners raising IATC claims.  
I rely on two assumptions in calculating this figure: First, I assume that during the 
same period Michigan prisoners filed about 1,800 additional petitions that federal courts 
dismissed or denied without asking the state to respond, resulting in approximately 5,400 
total petitions. This assumption is based in part on data initially gathered for KING ET AL., 
supra, showing that approximately one-third of habeas petitions filed by Michigan prisoners 
were dismissed without a filing by the state, but it is also supported by federal caseload 
statistics. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov 
/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics.aspx (showing, in Table C-3, 5,655 total habeas 
suits filed in Michigan district courts from March 2005 to March 2011). Second, I assume 
approximately 2,100 (39%) of those 5,400 petitions included an IATC claim. This assumption 
is also based in part on data initially gathered for KING ET AL., supra, showing that 
approximately 39% of Michigan habeas petitions raised an ineffectiveness claim, but it is also 
close to the percentage of state postconviction challenges that include this claim. See 
Memorandum from Dawn Van Hoek, Dir., Mich. State Appellate Defender Office 5 (Dec. 2, 
2011) (on file with author) (noting IATC claims are raised in about 35-37% of the state 
postconviction cases litigated by the state appellate defender office, which represents one-
quarter of the state’s indigent defendants seeking appellate review). The 28 petitions granted 
by federal courts thus represent 1.3% of the estimated 2,100 petitions that included IATC 
claims. 
11. For more on the defense of procedural default and the details of the Martinez case, see 6 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.4 (3d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2012); and 
Primus, supra note 6, at 2608-18.  
12. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320. Lower courts have also refused to apply Martinez in cases from 
states that permit petitioners to raise IATC claims based on the record on direct appeal, 
Primus, supra note 6, at 2618-20, but the Court may address this particular issue this Term. 
See Trevino v. Thaler, 449 F. App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 524 (2012). 
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petitioner’s claim was filed in federal court beyond the statute of limitations13 
or in a successive petition,14 was defaulted on direct or collateral appeal rather 
than at the initial collateral proceeding,15 or was raised by a petitioner who 
never sought state postconviction relief16 or declined representation when he 
did,17 the Martinez gateway to merits review remains closed.  
More importantly, securing merits review in federal habeas is no magic 
bullet. Before Martinez, federal district courts were considering the merits of 
constitutional claims in approximately half of all noncapital habeas cases, and 
denying more than 99% of them.18 And Martinez has not changed the reasons 
why federal judges deny almost all of the IATC claims they review on the 
merits. 
Assume, arguendo, that petitioners lose at least some IATC claims on the 
merits because they lack counsel (only 7% have attorneys)19 and do not receive 
evidentiary hearings (less than 1% receive hearings).20 There is no sign in post-
 
 
13. See, e.g., Adams v. Thaler, 679 F.3d 312, 322 n.6 (5th Cir. 2012); Sudduth v. Clements, No. 
12-CV-00645, 2012 WL 5289592 (D. Colo. Oct. 26, 2012); Hines v. Hobbs, No. 5:12CV00321, 
2012 WL 5416920 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 24, 2012); Capers v. Walsh, No. CIV.A. 12-4780, 2012 WL 
5389513 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2012). 
14. See, e.g., Osborne v. Purkett, No. 03-653-CV-W, 2012 WL 5511676 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 14, 
2012); Gale v. Wetzel, No. 1:12-CV-1315, 2012 WL 5467540 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012); see also 
KING ET AL., supra note 10, at 46-48 (reporting that 29% of noncapital cases were dismissed 
as either time-barred or successive, and that only 13% were dismissed at least in part as 
defaulted).	
15. See, e.g., Arnold v. Dormire, 675 F.3d 1082, 1087 (8th Cir. 2012).	
16. See, e.g., Jones v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 492 F. App’x 242 (3d Cir. 2012); Uptegrove v. 
Villmer, No. 12-0456-CV-W, 2012 WL 3637707 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 22, 2012); Bland v. Hobbs, 
No. 5:11-CV-00286, 2012 WL 2389904 (E.D. Ark. June 12, 2012).	
17. See, e.g., Bender v. Wynder, No. 05-998, 2012 WL 6737840 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2012); 
Thompson v. Varano, No. 12-1479, 2012 WL 3740622 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 2012). 	
18. KING ET AL., supra note 10, at 45, 56. The study found that federal courts did not reach the 
merits in between 42% and 58% of terminated noncapital cases. See NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH 
L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE 
OF THE GREAT WRIT 205 n.44 (2011).  
19. King, supra note 10, at 315-16 (finding also that, of those petitioners from the 2007 study 
who succeeded in the district courts, 67%, or eight of twelve, had attorneys); see also Justin 
F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
85, 132 (2012) (arguing that the rate of relief in noncapital cases would be much higher if 
petitioners had a right to counsel). 	
20. KING ET AL., supra note 10, at 36. These two features are linked. See RULES GOVERNING 
SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS R. 8(c) (2010), 
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Martinez decisions that Martinez has deterred judges from rejecting IATC 
claims without first providing counsel or hearings. Martinez did not lessen the 
fiscal pressures on the judicial branch, which pays for appointed counsel in 
habeas cases, nor did it create any right to counsel. And even though it is 
within a judge’s discretion to permit a petitioner to develop new facts for 
claims dismissed rather than denied in state court,21 federal judges after 
Martinez continue to deny IATC claims on their merits and without hearings 
when the petitioner was not diligent in developing the record in state court,22 
when his allegations are refuted by the record,23 or when those allegations 
																																																																																																																																																			
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/2254-2255.pdf (“If an evidentiary hearing is 
warranted, the judge must appoint an attorney to represent [an indigent petitioner].”). 
21. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 
(2007); see also Banks v. Workman, 692 F.3d 1133, 1144 n.4 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[A]n 
evidentiary hearing is not a fishing expedition. Instead, its function is to resolve disputed 
facts. And for that reason, a habeas court . . . ‘is required to conduct the evidentiary hearing 
only if the admissible evidence presented by petitioner, if accepted as true, would warrant 
relief as a matter of law.’” (quoting United States v. Velarde, 485 F.3d 553, 560 (10th Cir. 
2007))). 
22. See, e.g., Gallow v. Cooper, No. 10-30861, 2012 WL 3641520 (5th Cir. Aug. 24, 2012) 
(applying § 2254(e)); Halvorsen v. Parker, No. 08-484, 2012 WL 5866620 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 
19, 2012); Williams v. Mitchell, No. 1:09 CV 2246, 2012 WL 4505181 at *6 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 
28, 2012) (rejecting a request to allow claims of ineffective assistance of postconviction 
counsel to establish “cause” for a “default” of the factual development of claims for relief in 
state court, finding “nothing in Martinez that suggests the Supreme Court intended its 
limited holding to apply so broadly and in such a different context”). But see Proctor, supra 
note 7, at 279 (arguing that the “reasoning of Martinez would seem to require that the 
Supreme Court redefine ‘failure’ to exclude cases where counsel is responsible for the 
undeveloped state of the record,” and that petitioners “bringing Martinez-excused claims are 
very likely to meet this lower standard for an evidentiary hearing”). 
23. See, e.g., Walker v. Kerestes, No. 10-2009, 2012 WL 5494683, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2012) 
(reviewing a pro se petitioner’s defaulted IATC claim on its merits and concluding that the 
petitioner failed “to come forward with some factual matter beyond his own bald 
assertions”); Woodson v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 6:10-cv-649, 2012 WL 5199614 (M.D. 
Fla. Oct. 22, 2012) (rejecting, based on the record, a defaulted IATC claim raised by a pro se 
petitioner and finding that the claim is not substantial because the petitioner cannot show 
prejudice); Boseman v. Warden of Lee Corr. Inst., No. 2:11-3265, 2012 WL 5380636 (D.S.C. 
Sept. 24, 2012) (rejecting a new IATC claim on the merits without counsel or a hearing 
when one allegation was refuted by the record and another lacked prejudice); Glenn v. 
Wynder, No. Civ.A. 06-513, 2012 WL 4107827 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2012) (finding that a 
represented petitioner’s defaulted IATC claim was not substantial and denying a hearing); 
Haley v. Sauers, No. 10-5061, 2012 WL 3163951, at *12 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2012) (rejecting 
multiple new IATC claims without a hearing or counsel, and noting that an unsupported 
assertion “does not represent a substantial claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness”); 
Etenburn v. Norman, No. 4:11 CV 1181, 2012 WL 3027923 (E.D. Mo. July 24, 2012) (finding 
a claim not substantial, as it was refuted by the record); Madison v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of 
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would be futile if believed.24 Indeed, this was the outcome of Martinez’s own 
claim on remand.25 
Some have also predicted that by allowing judges to apply de novo review 
rather than “reasonableness” review for these otherwise defaulted claims, 
Martinez might increase the rate of relief.26 But judges applying de novo review 
after Martinez are continuing to find allegations of ineffective assistance 
unsupported, implausible, and insubstantial,27 just as they do when denying 
																																																																																																																																																			
Corr., No. 3:09-CV-444, 2012 WL 2680041 (M.D. Fla. July 6, 2012) (denying a hearing and 
counsel and finding that an IATC claim was meritless even under de novo review). 
The record before a federal judge may include trial counsel’s affidavit, submitted either 
by the state or the petitioner. See, e.g., Horonzy v. Smith, No. 1:11-CV-00235, 2012 WL 
4017927 (D. Idaho Sept. 12, 2012) (ordering an unrepresented petitioner to submit portions 
of his trial attorney’s file, letters the attorney had written to him about the status of the case, 
and/or an affidavit from her regarding the extent and nature of her work on his case); 
Rogers v. Pearson, No. 1:11cv1281, 2012 WL 3691085 (E.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2012) (denying 
discovery and hearing and rejecting an IATC claim on the merits when conflicts between 
affidavits and testimony were insufficient to establish prejudice).	
24. E.g., Suber v. Kerestes, No. 09-1049, 2012 WL 6681696 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2012) (denying a 
pro se petitioner’s defaulted IATC claim as meritless, without a hearing); Johnson v. Denny, 
No. 12-0960-CV-W-BP-P, 2012 WL 5904321, at *8 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 26, 2012) (denying a 
pro se petitioner’s IATC claim in part because “there was no reasonable probability that the 
outcome of the trial would have been different”); Cooper v. Warden of Lebanon Corr. Inst., 
No. 3:12cv00059, 2012 WL 5511320 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 14, 2012) (recommending that a pro se 
petitioner’s IATC claim be denied without a hearing); McCormack v. Baldridge, No. 1:10-
CV-00289, 2012 WL 4138479 (D. Idaho Sept. 19, 2012) (denying discovery, a hearing, and 
counsel, and denying an IATC claim, finding no prejudice possible); Anderson v. Hobbs, 
No. 5:10CV00258, 2012 WL 3111680 (E.D. Ark. July 9, 2012) (recommending the denial and 
dismissal of a pro se petition and finding that claims defaulted in state court where the 
prisoner had no counsel and no hearing were not substantial); Sinyard v. Mitchim, No 3:11-
CV-01398, 2012 WL 3502374 (N.D. Ala. June 13, 2012) (denying a pro se petitioner’s IATC 
claim without a hearing and noting that there was no evidence of prejudice, after the state 
court also denied hearing and counsel). 	
25. Martinez v. Schriro, No. CV 08-785, 2012 WL 5936566, at *6-13 (D. Ariz. Nov. 27, 2012). 
26. See Proctor, supra note 7, at 279 (also noting that district courts addressing the merits of 
otherwise defaulted IATC claims after Martinez will be able to apply circuit precedent, not 
just Supreme Court precedent); see also Michael M. O’Hear, Bypassing Habeas: The Right to 
Effective Assistance Requires Earlier Supreme Court Intervention in Cases of Attorney 
Incompetence, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 110, 118 (2012) (arguing that granting Strickland claims 
when the reasonableness standard does not apply carries less “sting” for state courts and 
does not weaken the reasonableness standard for other cases).  
27. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Clements, No. 12-cv-01884, 2012 WL 6217388, at *7 (D. Colo. Dec 13, 
2012) (finding, without a hearing, that a pro se petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel were not substantial); Woodson v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 6:10-cv-649, 2012 WL 
5199614 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2012) (finding an IATC claim insubstantial); Rogers v. Pearson, 
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IATC claims raised by pro se federal prisoners in § 2255 cases using de novo 
review.28 Strickland, as many have noted, is a very high bar, and Martinez did 
not lower it one notch.  
Two other developments suggest that for those petitioners who make it 
through the Martinez gateway to merits review, winning IATC claims may 
become more difficult, not easier, in the years to come. The first is the creeping 
acceptance of negotiated waivers of the right to seek postconviction review of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Judges are finding that such waivers 
bar later claims that an attorney provided constitutionally deficient 
representation both leading up to a guilty plea and after an agreement has been 
reached, and it is reasonable to assume prosecutors will embrace such a useful 
cost-saver whenever they can.29  
Second, the Frye and Lafler decisions, announced shortly after Martinez and 
widely hailed as victories for indigent defendants, may, ironically, make it more 
difficult for prisoners to win IATC claims. Some judges have enthusiastically 
accepted the Court’s invitation in Frye to “establish[]” at the plea colloquy 
“that the defendant has been given proper advice,”30 finding new ways to 
secure on-the-record statements from defense counsel that all plea offers were 
explained to the defendant and that the defendant was satisfied with his 
counsel’s advice.31 In courtrooms where judges are wary of either intruding into 
																																																																																																																																																			
1:11CV1281, 2012 WL 3691085 (E.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2012) (denying requests for discovery and 
an evidentiary hearing, and addressing an IATC claim and rejecting it on the merits while 
noting that “conflicts between the affidavits and Detective Harris’ testimony are insufficient 
to establish that Rogers’ defense was prejudiced”); Parker v. Curley, No. Civ.A. 10-5569, 
2012 WL 4931029 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2012) (finding IATC claims meritless based on the 
record, as an alternative ground, after the state court had rejected them as meritless without 
a hearing). This is no surprise. Federal judges before Martinez applied de novo rather than 
reasonableness review to a significant portion of claims and denied relief anyway. See KING 
ET AL., supra note 10, at 50. 
28. See, e.g., United States v. Gorham-Bey, Nos. CR 7-442, CV 12-366, 2012 WL 3155652 (W.D. 
Pa. Aug. 2, 2012) (rejecting pro se allegations of IATC without a hearing and finding no 
prejudice); United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, No. 07-CR-0026, 2012 WL 2277784, at *2 
(D. Minn. June 18, 2012) (denying counsel and finding allegations of coercion and prejudice 
refuted by the defendant’s record admission that she pleaded guilty “voluntarily and of 
[her] own free will” because she “committed a crime”).	
29. See Nancy J. King, Waiving Effective Assistance, 51 DUQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).  
30. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406-07 (2012).	
31. Norman L. Reimer, Frye and Lafler: Much Ado About What We Do—And What Prosecutors 
and Judges Should Not Do, CHAMPION, Apr. 2012, at 7, 7-8; D. Brock Hornby, Script of 
Proceeding, Rule 11—Guilty Plea (May 15, 2012), http://www.med.uscourts.gov/pdf 
/dbhscript.rule11.pdf (asking the defendant, as part of a federal district judge’s script for a 
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privileged communications or participating in plea negotiations,32 prosecutors 
may obtain such proof on their own. After Lafler and Frye, some prosecutors in 
Tennessee report that they will not make any offer at all unless defense counsel 
agrees to sign a new form that states the offer terms and that the offer was 
conveyed to the defendant.33 Before agreeing to any trial date, the defendant 
himself must sign that he “knowingly rejects the State’s previous offer(s) and 
elects to set his/her case for trial,” and defense counsel must sign that the 
defendant “has been advised of the State’s offer(s) and the benefits and 
disadvantages of proceeding to trial.”34 Other prosecutors ask each defendant 
to sign a statement of satisfaction with his representation, or insist that all 
offers and responses be in writing with copies to the defendant. Armed with 
such proof, prosecutors can more easily repel any later IATC attack on its 
merits.35  
																																																																																																																																																			
plea colloquy, whether he has “consulted with your lawyer in detail on this subject” and 
whether he is “satisfied with” his lawyer’s advice); see also Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea 
Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 HARV. L. REV. 150, 165, 167-68 (2012) (discussing 
ways in which prosecutors and judges can “make clean records to bulletproof their 
convictions”). 
32. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 20-21, United States v. Davila, No. 12-167  
(U.S. Aug. 13, 2012), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/12-167-
Petition.pdf (noting the difficulty of complying with the suggestion in Frye without 
inadvertently “participating” in negotiations). The Court will review this Term whether a 
violation of Rule 11’s ban on judicial participation requires reversal without regard to 
prejudice. United States v. Davila, 664 F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 831 
(2013). 
33. Office of the Dist. Att’y Gen., Metro. Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Plea Negotiation 
Memorandum [hereinafter Plea Negotiation Memorandum] (on file with author). As one 
prosecutor explained: “If a defendant refuses to sign, then he doesn’t get the offer. Defense 
attorneys love it because it protects them from ineffectiveness claims. And judges are happy 
to do anything that helps in [postconviction review].” E-mail from Pamela Anderson, 
Assistant Dist. Att’y Gen., Metro. Nashville & Davidson Cnty., to author (Nov. 28, 2012, 
7:31 PM) (on file with author). 
34. Plea Negotiation Memorandum, supra note 33.  
35. See, e.g., Capers v. Walsh, No. 12-4780, 2012 WL 5389513 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2012), adopted by 
No. 12-4780, 2012 WL 5395797 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2012) (noting that one reason the state 
court rejected the petitioner’s IATC allegation for failing to call alibi witnesses was that the 
defendant had “waived his ineffectiveness claims by stating during an on-the-record 
colloquy that he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation and he did not want to call 
any witnesses at trial”); Ellis v. Wengler, No. 1:10-CV-00405, 2012 WL 4009565 (D. Idaho 
Sept. 12, 2012) (finding an IATC claim insubstantial when the “plea questionnaire” 
completed by the petitioner before his sentencing hearing refuted his allegation that he was 
misled by his attorney and his own admissions precluded a finding of prejudice); Breeden v. 
State, No. 2011-CP-00437, 2012 WL 3665049 (Miss. App. Aug. 28, 2012) (finding that 
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i i .  martinez  and state postconviction review 
Even if federal courts do begin to grant more IATC claims after Martinez, 
there is little reason to expect state courts to provide more attorneys, hearings, 
or relief for these claims in their postconviction proceedings. Nor are states 
likely to withhold postconviction review and turn over enforcement to federal 
courts. Section II.A provides a preliminary empirical baseline for measuring 
potential changes in state postconviction litigation, and Section II.B explains 
why no such changes are likely to occur. 
A. State Postconviction Review Before Martinez 
State postconviction review is beginning to attract the attention of legal 
scholars.36 Yet there has been no attempt to find out how many noncapital 
prisoners seek postconviction relief in state courts each year, much less how 
many of these cases actually involve counsel, a state response, fact-finding, or 
relief.37 Without data, one can only guess what really goes on during this phase 
of the criminal process, and what effect a decision like Martinez might have on 
that process. The dearth of information is understandable: in some states, a 
request for postconviction relief is docketed like any other motion in a criminal 
case, and so even counting how many requests are filed would require an 
inspection of each docket sheet. Nevertheless, I was able to obtain some 
																																																																																																																																																			
allegations of IATC were contradicted by sworn testimony that the petitioner had been 
thoroughly advised and was satisfied with his attorneys’ services). 	
36. E.g., Eric M. Freedman, State Post-Conviction Remedies in the Next Fifteen Years: How Synergy 
Between the State and Federal Governments Can Improve the Criminal Justice System Nationally, 
24 FED. SENT’G REP. 298, 298 (2012) (“[T]he adequacy of state postconviction proceedings 
will be a centrally contested issue in the years ahead.”); Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the 
Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 146-56, 166-76 (2011); 
O’Hear, supra note 26, at 110, 120 (emphasizing the need for state postconviction courts to 
take the lead in developing and enforcing effective assistance standards); Eve Brensike 
Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 12 (2010) (advocating a 
“focus on systemic state practices”); Samuel R. Wiseman, Habeas After Pinholster, 53 B.C. L. 
REV. 953, 972-86 (2012) (discussing potential challenges to fact-finding procedures in state 
proceedings).	
37. Neither the National Center for State Courts nor the Bureau of Justice Statistics attempts to 
collect information on state postconviction proceedings. The latest effort to do so was two 
decades ago, examining cases in four states. See Victor E. Flango & Patricia McKenna, 
Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 237 (1995) 
(reporting a study of cases filed between 1990 and 1992 in Alabama, California, New York, 
and Texas). 
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aggregate information about these proceedings from fifteen of the thirty states 
with the largest prison populations (10,000 or more in 2010). The summary 
below provides the first empirical snapshot of contemporary state 
postconviction review, one that, albeit incomplete, might serve as a baseline for 
measuring potential change.  
1. Filing Rates 
Table 1 reports, for fifteen states, the number of requests for relief filed 
using each state’s primary postconviction remedy during the years 2008 to 
2011. Tables 2A and 2B compare these filings with convictions, for those states 
with conviction data available. The number of defendants who seek 
postconviction relief is surprisingly small—roughly 3% of the total number of 
convictions from the state’s trial court of general jurisdiction, or 3-4% of felony 
convictions. If these states are representative, postconviction review is 
irrelevant for more than 96% of cases in our nation’s criminal courts.38  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38. See also Memorandum from Dawn Van Hoek, supra note 10, at 3 (reporting that in 
Michigan, where postconviction claims are raised on direct appeal, 7% of those convicted of 
felonies and eligible to appeal seek review, and about 23% of those withdraw their appeals, 
for an appeal rate of just over 5%). 
Even less is known about how many of the petitioners who do seek review raise IATC 
claims, but it is likely near 40%. Twenty years ago, approximately 40% of state 
postconviction petitioners in the four states examined by Flango and McKenna were raising 
some sort of ineffectiveness claim, including appellate as well as trial counsel. Flango & 
McKenna, supra note 37, at 249-50. Michigan prisoners have raised trial-counsel 
ineffectiveness claims at approximately the same rate in recent years. See Memorandum 
from Dawn Van Hoek, supra note 10, at 5. About half of those filing federal petitions ten 
years ago raised either a trial or appellate counsel ineffectiveness claim. Id.  
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Table 1. 
initial collateral review filings, noncapital cases, by state and year  
 
state  2008 2009 2010 2011 
ar 181 154 182 177 
az 2,257 1,875 1,746 2,192 
ca 8,233 8,550 8,707 8,767 
fl 17,750 17,866 15,757 17,506 
ga n/a n/a n/a 1175 
in39 992 1,049 1,207 1,362 
mo 963 1,066 1,033 998 
ms 420 381 444 499 
nj n/a 801 907 1,005 
or 501 596 580 494 
pa40 693 1,621 1,980 1,944 
sc 732 828 770 n/a 
tn 535 496 427 531 
tx41 5,035 4,791 4,275 4,229 
wa 1,084 1,053 978 873 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39. Data from Indiana and South Carolina included death penalty cases. 
40. These figures include amended petitions, so the totals overstate the actual number of cases 
filed. See infra text accompanying note 72. 
41. Data from Texas and Washington included filings in the court of appeals. 
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Table 2A. 
ratio of post-conviction filings to total convictions from general 
jurisdiction trial courts, by state, 2010-2011   
post-conviction filings year 2011 2010 
Divided by total convictions from 
general jurisdiction court year
42
 
2010 2009 2008 2009 2008 
state      
ar 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
az 0.050 0.045 0.045 0.036 0.036 
ca 0.046 0.051 0.053 0.051 0.053 
co43 0.008 0.007 0.007 n/a n/a 
fl 0.114 0.102 0.092 0.092 0.083 
mo 0.008 0.008 n/a 0.008 n/a 
nj 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.023 
pa 0.014 0.014 n/a n/a n/a 
sc n/a n/a n/a 0.015 0.016 
tn 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 
tx 0.036 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.036 
wa 0.031 0.028 0.025 0.031 0.028 
      
median 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.028 0.030 
mean 0.031 0.030 0.033 0.030 0.032 
 
 
 
 
 
42. This method is designed to examine differing time lags between conviction and 
postconviction filing. Total convictions include both felonies and misdemeanors. 
43. These figures compare total postconviction review filings in 4 of 22 judicial districts between 
November 1, 2011, and April 30, 2012 (n = 79), to half the number of annual convictions 
from those districts. 
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Table 2B. 
ratio of post-conviction filings to felony convictions, by state, 2010-2011 
post-conviction filings year 2011 2010 
Divided by felony convictions from 
general jurisdiction court year
44
 
2010 2009 2008 2009 2008 
state      
ar 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 
az 0.051 0.045 0.046 0.036 0.037 
ca 0.053 0.062 0.064 0.062 0.064 
co45 0.020 0.018 0.018 n/a n/a 
mo 0.025 0.024 n/a 0.025 n/a 
tx 0.039 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.037 
wa 0.036 0.033 0.029 0.038 0.032 
      
median 0.036 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.037 
mean 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.035 
2. Counsel and Hearings 
Even fewer states collect information about counsel or hearings in state 
postconviction proceedings. Based on available information, the provision of 
counsel and hearings varies from almost always to nearly never. In all but the 
handful of states with public defender offices specifically tasked with 
postconviction representation,46 organized defender offices are often conflicted 
out of postconviction cases because of IATC claims against them. That means 
that when attorneys are appointed in these cases, they are more likely to be 
 
 
44. This method is designed to examine differing time lags between conviction and 
postconviction filing. 
45. These figures compare total postconviction review filings in 4 of 22 judicial districts between 
November 1, 2011, and April 30, 2012 (n = 79), to half the number of annual felony 
convictions from those districts. 
46. See Holly R. Stevens et al., Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, State, 
County and Local Expenditures for Indigent Defense Services: Fiscal Year 2008, A.B.A. (Nov. 
2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent 
_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_expenditures_fy08.authcheckdam.pdf (surveying funding for 
indigent defense state by state). 	
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private attorneys rather than public defenders,47 and private attorneys tend to 
have fewer resources and face more difficult incentives than their public 
defender counterparts.48 In some states, judges reportedly consider 
postconviction cases good training for novice attorneys.49 
A minority of states do routinely appoint counsel in postconviction cases. 
In Michigan, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin, IATC and other postconviction 
claims are included with the defendant’s direct appeal (where all defendants 
receive representation), with remand ordered by the appellate court when 
necessary for record development.50 Judges in Missouri and Maryland, both 
states with postconviction defender offices, reportedly appoint counsel 
regularly for postconviction cases.51 The Court in Martinez listed a number of 
additional states that it asserted “appoint counsel in every first collateral 
proceeding.”52 In four of those states, however, some portion of pro se petitions 
are actually dismissed without appointment because they are either beyond the 
filing deadline or successive.53 And appointed counsel in other states, such as 
 
 
47. E.g., Memorandum from Dawn Van Hoek, supra note 10, at 2 (noting that 83% of indigent 
appeals are handled by private assigned counsel paid by counties). 
48. See James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The 
Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L. J. 154, 188-200 (2012). 
49. Telephone Interview with Roger Moore, Assistant Dist. Att’y, Metro. Nashville & Davidson 
Cnty., (Oct. 24, 2012); see also Donald J. Harris, Kim Nieves & Thomas M. Place, Dispatch 
and Delay: Post Conviction Relief Act Litigation in Non-Capital Cases, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 467, 482 
(2003) (noting “the inexperience of many of the attorneys appointed to PCRA cases” in 
Pennsylvania); Harris District Courts Plan, HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT CTS. (Jan. 28, 2011), 
http://tidc.tamu.edu/IDPlan/ViewPlan.aspx?PlanID=294 (imposing the least stringent 
experience requirements on lawyers appointed to postconviction cases). 	
50. See Brief for the States of Wisconsin et al., supra note 9, at 25. 
51. Telephone Interview with Greg Mermelstein, Division Dir., Mo. State Pub. Defender (Nov. 
20, 2012) (reporting that in Missouri, timely filed postconviction cases are not dismissed 
before appointment and that all indigent petitioners are provided attorneys); Telephone 
Interview with Scott Whitney, Chief Att’y, Collateral Rev. Div., Off. of the Pub. Defender 
for Md. (Nov. 19, 2012) (noting that most postconviction cases in Maryland receive counsel, 
but that a case may be dismissed without hearing or counsel if the petition is complete 
gibberish, is filed without complying with the rules, is filed more than ten years after 
sentencing unless “extraordinary cause” is established, or seeks to reopen earlier 
postconviction proceedings). 
52. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1319 (2012) (listing Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, 
North Carolina, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Tennessee).  
53. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.85.100(c)(1) (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-14-205 (2011); ARIZ. R. 
CRIM. P. 32.4(c)(2) (2011); N.J. CT. R. 3:22-6(b) (2011); see also Telephone Interview with 
Roger Moore, supra note 49 (“We only get the [post-conviction] case if the judge finds a 
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Pennsylvania,54 may be able to withdraw after filing an Anders brief.55  
Most states authorize the appointment of counsel for noncapital petitioners 
only if a judge first decides the case has merit or orders a hearing or discovery. 
In such states, only a small portion of petitioners appear to receive counsel. For 
example, court records for postconviction cases filed in Mississippi between 
2008 and 2011 show that in only 15% did any counsel appear for the 
petitioner.56 In Texas, over the same period, the proportion is even smaller—
about 10-12% of noncapital habeas petitioners receive counsel.57 In Colorado, in 
a forthcoming study of cases filed between November 2011 and April 2012 in 
four judicial districts that produce approximately 30% of the state’s felony 
convictions, roughly a quarter of those seeking postconviction relief were 
ultimately represented by counsel.58 In Georgia, no law authorizes payment for 
																																																																																																																																																			
colorable claim and assigns a lawyer. Most of them do here unless it is clear that the statute’s 
run. Anything that’s within the statute and remotely sounds like [ineffective assistance of 
counsel], we get.”).  
54. E.g., Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1184 (Pa. 2012); see also Harris et al., supra note 
49, at 474 (noting right to appointment of counsel for initial petitions and withdrawal 
procedure).	
55. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (permitting attorneys to withdraw if they 
determine that no nonfrivolous issues exist on appeal). 
56. Case statistics provided by the Mississippi Administrative Office of the Courts (on file with 
author). 
57. Noncapital state habeas petitions in Texas are filed in the trial courts, typically without 
counsel, and then forwarded to the Court of Criminal Appeals for resolution. See TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (West 2007); TEX. R. APP. P. 73.3 (2012); 43B GEORGE E. DIX & 
JOHN M. SCHMOLESKY, TEXAS PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 58:14 (3d 
ed. 2011 & Supp. 2012) (“[O]nly the Court of Criminal Appeals may grant relief in those 
cases within the statute. . . . While the district courts have a role in the process, it is not that 
of decision maker.”); Telephone Interview with Kelley Reyes, Chief Deputy Clerk, Tex. 
Court of Criminal Appeals (Oct. 3 & 17, 2012). That court orders appointment of counsel for 
petitioners whose state habeas petitions are “filed and set” for further consideration in the 
Court of Criminal Appeals, and also for those petitioners whose cases it remands for 
factfinding in the trial courts. After remand, the case returns to the Court of Criminal 
Appeals for resolution. Interview with Kelley Reyes, supra. Cases “filed and set” and cases 
remanded for factfinding together represent approximately 11-12% of the noncapital habeas 
petitions filed each year. See Office of Court Admin., Annual Reports, TEX. CTS., 
http://www.txcourts.gov/pubs/annual-reports.asp (last updated Nov. 30, 2012) (documenting 
annual Court of Criminal Appeals activity) [hereinafter Texas Annual Reports]. 
58. E-mail from Veronica Marceny, Policy Analyst, Div. of Planning & Analysis, Co. Office of 
the State Court Adm’r, to author (Nov. 28, 2012, 5:27 PM) (on file with author) (describing 
the study and its results).  
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indigent defense representation in postconviction cases.59 
In at least some states where postconviction petitioners usually do receive 
counsel—such as Alaska, Maryland, and Missouri—live witness hearings are 
reportedly routine.60 Conversely, in states where counsel is not the norm, 
neither are live witness hearings. In Washington state, where prisoners must 
file their “personal restraint petitions” initially in the Court of Appeals, only 
about 4.5% of those who filed in 2008 through 2011 received remands to the 
trial court for any reason, including factual development.61 In Texas, where 
petitions are forwarded to the Court of Criminal Appeals for resolution, about 
7-8% of those filed each year are remanded by the Court of Criminal Appeals 
for factual development in the trial court, but very few receive “live” hearings. 
In 2011, of 347 remands, only two were for a hearing with live witnesses.62 
“Paper hearings” are also the norm in Oregon, where petitions are filed in the 
trial courts.63 In California, approximately 10% of the noncapital habeas cases 
terminated in the trial courts receive hearings, but there is little consistency 
among counties. In one California county, hearings are held in every single 
case, while in others, courts dispose of hundreds of cases each year with no 
 
 
59. See Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186, 191 (Ga. 1999); see also Wilson v. State, 686 S.E.2d 
104, 108-09 (Ga. 2009) (Hunstein, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 
Gibson, 513 S.E.2d 186). 
60. See Jones v. State, 284 P.3d 853, 860 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012); Telephone Interview with Scott 
Whitney, supra note 51 (stating that most cases in Maryland receive hearings, which involve 
live testimony, not “paper hearings”); E-mail from Greg Mermelstein, Div. Dir., Mo. State 
Pub. Defender, to author (Dec. 10, 2012, 4:07 PM) (on file with author) (“In general, you 
have to have a hearing to win an [ineffective assistance of counsel] claim here in Missouri, 
so the attorneys testify ‘live’ at hearings (when you get a hearing).”).  
61. Case statistics provided by the Washington State Administrative Office of the Courts (on 
file with author). 
62. Court of Criminal Appeals Activity: FY 2011, TEX. CTS. 2 (Jan. 2012), http://www 
.txcourts.gov/pubs/AR2011/cca/2-cca-activity.pdf. Prior years’ activity reports do not report 
the number of live hearings granted. 
63. See PDSC Service Delivery Plan for Post Conviction Relief Cases, PUB. DEF. SERV. COMMISSION 
22 (June 18, 2009), http://www.oregon.gov/OPDS/docs/Reports/postconvictionrelief609.pdf 
(summarizing testimony of Judge James Hargreaves of the Oregon Circuit Court) (“Only 
occasionally is live testimony presented at the hearing except for brief testimony by the 
petitioner. It is a paper trial and that is the only way these cases can get done.”) [hereinafter 
PDSC Plan]; id. at 19 (summarizing the testimony of postconviction attorney Noel 
Grefenson) (“Although there is a hearing in every case, most of the time [Mr. Grefenson] 
does not call live witnesses.”).	
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hearings at all.64  
3. Relief 
What scarce information is available on wins and losses in these cases 
suggests that relief, too, varies by state, but that in most states, petitioners 
rarely succeed in challenging their convictions, even when represented by 
counsel. Statistics were available from six states: Michigan, Texas, 
Washington, South Carolina, Colorado, and Pennsylvania.  
In Michigan, where IATC claims are raised with counsel on direct appeal 
and remanded for a hearing if factfinding is required, the Wayne County 
Prosecutor’s Office, which handles about a quarter of the state’s criminal 
caseload, reported that in only 5 out of the over 1,200 court of appeals decisions 
it received from 2008 to 2011 did a court order relief for an IATC claim.65 If 
Wayne County defendants raised IATC claims at the same rate (approximately 
36%) as defendants from other Michigan counties,66 the grant rate for IATC 
claims brought by represented prisoners in state court was less than 1%. (The 
Michigan Attorney General, defending cases on behalf of county prosecutors in 
the 56 smallest counties in the state, reported that in none of the 582 cases it 
 
 
64. 2012 Court Statistics Report: Statewide Caseload Trends, JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL. 153 tbl.12f 
(2012), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2012-Court-Statistics-Report.pdf. In a study 
of petitions for postconviction relief filed in Pennsylvania trial courts between 1998 and 
2001, hearing rates varied by county and judge as well. See Harris et al., supra note 49, at 
487-89 (reporting that at least 88 of 230 cases (38%) were dismissed without a hearing in 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, but also noting that some judges reported granting a 
hearing for every timely petition); see also Wiseman, supra note 36, at 974-76 (surveying 
rules for postconviction “fact development” in state courts). 
65. Letter from Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training, and Appeals, Wayne Cnty. 
Office of the Prosecuting Att’y, to Ronald Schafer, Prosecuting Att’y, Ionia Cnty. 
Prosecutor’s Office 1 (Feb. 14, 2012) (on file with author). Four of the five cases involved 
retained, not appointed, counsel, id. at 2, and one was later reversed for reconsideration 
under Lafler, People v. McCauley, 821 N.W.2d 569 (Mich. 2012). It is possible that this 
actually overstates the grant rate. Approximately 7,000 criminal appeals (appeals of right 
and discretionary appeals from guilty-plea convictions) were filed statewide, in the years 
2008 through 2011. E-mail from Larry Royster, Chief Clerk/Research Dir., Mich. Court of 
Appeals, to author (Dec. 12, 2012, 3:13 PM) (on file with author). If Wayne County 
prisoners filed 25% of these appeals, that would represent over 1,700, not 1,200, total appeals 
during that period.	
66. Memorandum from Dawn Van Hoek, supra note 10, at 5 (reporting data from 2009 and 
2010).  
  
enforcing effective assistance after martinez   
2447 
	
litigated between 2005 and 2010 did the state courts grant an IATC claim.67)  
In Texas, where only the Court of Criminal Appeals (not the trial court) is 
authorized to resolve these cases, approximately 4% of the noncapital state 
habeas petitions filed result in a grant of any form of relief.68  
In Washington, where petitioners initially file in the Court of Appeals, 
which may either resolve the case or remand for resolution in the trial court, 
the Court of Appeals has granted relief in about 1% of petitions filed between 
2008 and 2011. Another 4.5% were remanded to the trial courts for unknown 
resolution.69 
In South Carolina, of 1,727 capital and noncapital postconviction cases 
resolved by the trial courts in 2010 and 2011, at most 2.4% were granted relief 
of any kind.70  
Of the 79 postconviction motions filed in Colorado’s four-district study of 
cases filed in early 2012, only 2 received relief (in the form of resentencing), 11 
are still pending, and the rest were denied or dismissed, resulting in a grant 
rate of 2-16% depending upon the pending cases.71  
Pennsylvania court statistics indicated a somewhat higher rate of relief. 
 
 
67. Letter from Joel D. McGormley, supra note 10, at 2.  
68. See Texas Annual Reports, supra note 57. 
69. Of the 3,801 total cases terminated between 2008 and 2011 (including capital cases), the 
court granted relief in 1.2%. See case statistics provided by the Washington State 
Administrative Office of the Courts (on file with author). 
70. A list of postconviction case numbers with disposition codes was provided to me by the 
South Carolina Office of Court Administration in response to a statistics request. For each 
case showing a disposition code of anything other than “dismissed” or “withdrawn,” I 
obtained additional docket information from the state court’s webpage. See Case Records 
Search, S.C. JUD. DEP’T, http://www.sccourts.org/caseSearch (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). Only 
42 of these 1,727 cases included an entry indicating that the final order was something other 
than denial or dismissal. Of those 42, in 17 the docket entry indicated that the court had 
ordered that the petitioner be allowed to file a belated appeal of a previous order rejecting 
postconviction relief (no information was available on the outcome of any subsequent 
appeal), and in 9 cases there were conflicting docket entries suggesting that relief was not 
granted after all (that is, the docket showed either that the judgment was appealed by the 
state or that the case status was “dismissal,” or both). If these 26 cases are omitted, the grant 
rate for these two years is less than 1%. Capital cases were included in the South Carolina 
statistics, as they could not be distinguished from noncapital cases based on docket 
information, but the state has sentenced four or fewer defendants to death each year since 
2005. Death Sentences in the United States From 1977 By State and By Year, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-2008 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2013).  
71. E-mail from Veronica Marceny, supra note 58. 
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Court of Common Pleas judges granted these petitions, at least in part, in 
approximately 18% of the 1,377 cases in which a petition for postconviction 
relief was filed in 2011 and terminated by February 2013. Of those cases in 
which a postconviction petition was granted, approximately 44% resulted only 
in the reinstatement of the right to file a direct appeal or postsentence motion. 
Another 22% of the grants involved some sort of sentencing relief, including 
recalculation of sentencing credits. Only 10% of the grants (less than 2% of the 
cases) clearly involved the withdrawal of a guilty plea, or a new trial.72 
Attorneys in several other states also estimated that relief from conviction 
was granted in a small percentage of cases, although the rate for other types of 
claims (a chance at belated appeal, for example) varied.73  
 
 
72. Case statistics provided by the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts (on file with 
author). The type of relief granted could not be determined in 24% of cases. 
73. PDSC Plan, supra note 63, at 21 (reporting an Oregon judge’s testimony that “only three to 
five percent have merit”); Telephone Interview with Jay A. Macke, Supervisor, 
Appeals/Postconviction, Office of the Ohio Pub. Defender (Nov. 13, 2012) (on file with 
author) (stating that so few cases succeed, “it is like a dead remedy”); Telephone Interview 
with Greg Mermelstein, supra note 51 (reporting that in Missouri, approximately 2-10% of 
cases filed result in some relief, many including sentencing reductions); E-mail from Scott 
Whitney, Chief Att’y, Collateral Rev. Div., Office of the Pub. Defender for Md., to author 
(Nov. 27, 2012, 4:55 PM) (on file with author) (“We [public defenders] win relief in about 
25% of our cases. Often it is minor [claims] and the major allegations are denied. (For 
example, the petitioner is granted the opportunity to file a belated appeal but his claims that 
would require reversal of his conviction are denied.) . . . Most of the post conviction relief 
granted in Maryland is the opportunity to file a belated motion for modification or 
reduction of sentence. . . . [Out of] 600 petitions filed in a 12 month period . . . we do win 
about 15-20 new trials each year.”). 
A comparison of the number of postconviction appeals in 2009-2011 with the number 
of trial court filings from the preceding year, in four states—Arizona, California, Florida, 
and Tennessee—suggests that on average appeal rates differ by state (ranging from 25% to 
66%), with a median overall rate of 45%. Only a tiny percentage of those who lose in state 
court petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. See Giovanna Shay & 
Christopher Lasch, Initiating a New Constitutional Dialogue: The Increased Importance Under 
AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari from Judgments of State Courts, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 249, 
255-58 (2008) (reporting that only 4% of criminal certiorari petitions during the Supreme 
Court’s 2006 Term sought review of state postconviction decisions, and offering 
explanations from survey responses indicating why so few are filed).  
For relief statistics from prior studies, see Flango & McKenna, supra note 37, at 259 
(reporting an 8% relief rate for ineffective assistance claims); John S. Gillig, Kentucky Post-
Conviction Remedies and the Judicial Development of Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.42, 
83 KY. L.J. 265, 343 (1994) (reporting that a new trial was ordered in only 2% of 342 
published opinions in appeals of adverse decisions); and Stephen J. Perrello & Albert N. 
Delzeit, Habeas Corpus in San Diego Superior Court (1991-1993): An Empirical Study, 19 T. 
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B. State Postconviction Review After Martinez: The Forecast for Change 
This snapshot of state postconviction review reveals that before Martinez, 
many prisoners had only the slimmest hope of securing counsel or a hearing, 
much less relief, for a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. There is no 
reason to expect that Martinez will change this. Even expanded federal review 
of ineffectiveness claims is unlikely to prompt an increase in the number of 
filings, hearings, appointed counsel, or grants in state postconviction cases. 
1. Filing Rates 
Better prospects of securing relief in federal court won’t encourage many 
more state prisoners to file IATC claims in state court, for at least three 
reasons. First, all but a few states now postpone consideration of IATC 
challenges until after direct appeal,74 and many have recently taken steps to 
reduce terms of incarceration.75 Both policies reduce postconviction filings 
because prisoners who would file if still incarcerated will be released before 
they have the chance.76  
Second, even those who are still incarcerated when it is time to file may be 
deterred by the possibility that filing could delay their release on parole. 
Prisoners with indeterminate sentences may worry that challenging their 
criminal judgments will jeopardize their chances for discretionary release if the 
attack is seen as evidence of failure to take full responsibility for their crimes.77  
																																																																																																																																																			
JEFFERSON L. REV. 283, at 294 (1997) (reporting a 2% relief rate). In addition, a study of 
approximately 4,000 petitions filed between 1998 and 2001 in three large counties in 
Pennsylvania found that less than 2% resulted in a grant of either a new trial or a sentencing 
hearing. An additional 9% of petitioners had their appellate rights restored. Harris et al., 
supra note 49, at 490. 
74. See State v. Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192 (Iowa 2010) (overruling an earlier requirement that a 
defendant demonstrate the potential viability of any ineffective assistance claim raised on 
direct appeal in order to preserve the claim for postconviction relief); LAFAVE ET AL., supra 
note 11, §§ 11.7(e), 28.4; Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: 
Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 689 (2007). 
75. Steps have included reducing minimum terms of incarceration, accelerating parole 
eligibility, and expanding good time credits. See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 11,  
§ 26.1(c) n.39.4 (collecting authority). 
76. See, e.g., KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 18, at 73-76. 
77. Telephone Interview with Jay A. Macke, supra note 73 (stating that the parole board takes a 
collateral attack on the conviction as evidence that a prisoner has not taken full 
responsibility for his crime, but noting that only a portion of Ohio prisoners get 
discretionary release); Telephone Interview with Roger Moore, supra note 49 (“If a prisoner 
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Third, a prisoner who has negotiated a plea bargain is not going to file once 
he learns that seeking postconviction relief may cost him his deal,78 and the 
Court’s decisions in Martinez, Frye, and Lafler did nothing to dispel this 
apprehension. Rather, in state courts where plea negotiations had previously 
been conducted informally, the Court’s suggestion in Frye that every deal be 
recorded in writing79 will strengthen this disinclination to file because it will 
make even more clear to a defendant each and every charge and sentencing 
concession he stands to lose by upending his plea bargain.80 Formalizing 
bargaining and creating records demonstrating that defendants have received 
and understood specified information may help to prevent misunderstandings 
between overworked prosecutors, overworked defenders, and those accused of 
crimes, but it may also mean that even more defendants will be reluctant to 
challenge the resulting deals.81  
																																																																																																																																																			
has a parole date coming up, he doesn’t want to file a [postconviction claim]—filing a 
[claim] may defer his parole. Not automatic, but the board may think, ‘You’re still fighting 
this case, why should we parole you if you are asking for a trial?’”). But see Telephone 
Interview with Edward L. Marshall, Chief, Postconviction Litig. Div., Office of the Att’y 
Gen. of Tex. (Nov. 9, 2012) (doubting that the parole board would ever consider whether a 
prisoner filed a postconviction challenge, but noting that “an inmate is going to believe what 
he wants to believe, and if you’re gambling on parole release you are not going to be filing 
petitions”). 
78. 2 JULIE RAMSEUR LEWIS & JOHN RUBIN, NORTH CAROLINA DEFENDER MANUAL: TRIAL 374 
(2d ed. 2012), http://www.ncids.org/Def%20Manual%20Info/Text_Vol_2.htm (warning 
against challenging pleas to lesser offenses); PDSC Plan, supra note 63, at 19 (noting that 
“[s]ome cases are resolved quickly when the inmate realizes that if he is successful in 
overturning his plea agreement the result will not be a dismissal of the case but a return to 
court to face all of the charges again, including those that were dismissed”); Memorandum 
from Dawn Van Hoek, supra note 10, at 3 (reporting that approximately 23% of cases are 
withdrawn “due to the risk that vacating a plea-based conviction would expose them to 
original, higher, charges”); Telephone Interview with Jay A. Macke, supra note 73 (“We’ve 
had cases where the guy wins and then gets a worse sentence.”); Telephone Interview with 
Roger Moore, supra note 49 (“In one capital case I remember, the guy pled guilty and got 
life, and we told him if you get this [postconviction motion] granted we’ll file the death 
request—he started crying and decided not to do it.”). 
79. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012). 
80. To avoid Frye and Lafler claims in state court, prosecutors who have in the past “charged 
low” and added charges if a plea offer was refused may now decide to spell out the foregone 
charges in more detail, or even “charge high” and reduce charges after a plea. In Texas, the 
prospect of having to defend Frye challenges in state court has prompted some prosecutors 
to avoid both serial negotiations and open-ended offers and instead make a single offer with 
a firm deadline. Telephone Interview with Edward L. Marshall, supra note 77. 
81. Also, as one prosecutor reported, it may also create more pressure on defendants to plead 
guilty even earlier. Telephone Interview with Roger Moore, supra note 49 (“A lot of 
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2. Counsel and Hearings 
Martinez is also unlikely to increase the provision of counsel and hearings 
in those state postconviction cases that are filed. Even if a state’s attorney 
general hires more lawyers to defend habeas petitions in federal court after 
Martinez, state trial judges responsible for appointing counsel and ordering 
hearings in state postconviction proceedings won’t feel the pinch unless federal 
judges start sending more cases back for retrial. Federal habeas might then 
provide resource-strapped courts an incentive to appoint more counsel and 
order more hearings, but only if judges are convinced both that those 
additional resources are needed in order to lower the likelihood of federal 
grants and that the benefits of avoiding federal grants are worth the cost. Both 
are unlikely. 
State judges need not provide either counsel or evidentiary hearings in 
order to ensure that their decisions denying Strickland claims survive de novo 
review in federal court. If a petitioner’s allegations, once proved, would not 
entitle him to relief, are contradicted by the record, or are inherently incredible, 
state judges may reasonably expect federal judges to uphold their practice of 
denying IATC claims without hearing or counsel, which they have continued 
after Martinez.82 After all, federal judges themselves continue, after Martinez, to 
follow the same procedure when reviewing IATC claims raised for the first 
time by federal petitioners.83  
State judges know that strategies far less expensive than hearings and 
counsel are available to help deflect later attacks in federal habeas. Issuing an 
alternative ruling on the merits, for example, may allow a state to invoke 
Pinholster in federal court,84 and issuing a summary denial when claims would 
otherwise be rejected solely on procedural grounds may allow it to invoke 
																																																																																																																																																			
attorneys tell me that they think asking the defendants to sign is making a difference. They 
say, ‘When I ask a defendant to sign off, he thinks maybe he should take the offer after 
all.’”); cf. Jed S. Rakoff, Frye and Lafler: Bearers of Mixed Messages, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 25, 
26-27 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/06/18/rakoff.html (arguing that Frye and Lafler 
will lead to earlier pleas); Reimer, supra note 31, at 8 (“[T]he practice of offering and 
demanding an immediate plea . . . [is a] root cause of systemically deficient 
representation.”). 
82. See, e.g., cases collected supra notes 22-24.	
83. See, e.g., cases collected supra notes 27-28.  
84. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (holding that review under 28 U.S.C.  
§ 2254(d)(1) is “limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the 
claim on the merits”). 
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Richter.85 As post-Martinez decisions confirm, obtaining an affidavit from the 
petitioner’s trial counsel can provide a basis for a finding by the state judge that 
the alleged conduct didn’t happen, was strategic, or, if error, was not 
prejudicial.86 An affidavit may also serve as a basis for a federal judge to find 
that new claims based on different allegations are not “substantial” or lack 
merit.87 Defenders will have difficulty convincing state judges they must invest 
more resources in state postconviction proceedings in noncapital cases in order 
to avoid reversal in federal court. 
Even less plausible is the argument that the costs saved by avoiding grants 
in federal court are worth investing more resources in state postconviction 
procedures. Elected county judges and prosecutors do not necessarily suffer 
politically when federal judges order do-overs in state criminal cases, especially 
if the cause of the reversal is the defendant’s own lawyer. Indeed, most of the 
Strickland violations in Michigan were committed by private counsel retained 
by the defendants themselves, not attorneys appointed and paid with public 
funds.88 Voters, victims, and county commissioners are unlikely to blame their 
state judges for that. 
 From a fiscal perspective, most noncapital cases receiving federal habeas 
relief have been, and will continue to be, cheap to fix. New trial orders are 
uncommon. A large portion of IATC claims themselves seek only a sentence 
 
 
85. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (ruling relief is unavailable under § 2254(d) 
if any reasonable application of established Supreme Court precedent supports summary 
denial).  
86. E.g., State v. Johnson, No. 9904015635, 2012 WL 5364693 at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 
2012) (finding that “allegations were either reasonably discounted as not supported by the 
record, persuasively rebutted by counsel’s Affidavit, or not” relevant); see also Doug Lieb, 
Regulating Through Habeas: A Bad Incentive for Bad Lawyers?, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 7, 11 
(2012), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/regulating-through-habeas (“[H]abeas 
lawyers often find themselves competing with the state attorney general’s office . . . to 
quickly secure trial counsel’s cooperation and her commitment to submit a favorable 
affidavit.”); Telephone Interview with Edward L. Marshall, supra note 77 (stating that, in 
Texas, the court will often order the trial attorney to file an affidavit answering the 
allegations the inmate has made, and that defense counsel accused of ineffective assistance 
will often provide an affidavit rebutting petitioner’s claims when asked to do so by the state, 
even if not ordered to do so by the court).	
87. E.g., Parker v. Curley, No. Civ.A. 10-5569, 2012 WL 4931029 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2012).  
88. Letter from Joel D. McGormley, supra note 10, at 5 (reviewing federal habeas cases decided 
between 2005 and 2010). 
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reduction or an opportunity to appeal.89 Even relief for a Lafler or Frye claim 
only requires amending the judgment to reflect the foregone deal, not a new 
trial. And when a federal court does vacate a conviction for ineffective 
assistance, the order simply puts the defendant and the prosecutor back at 
square one, with at least as much incentive to avoid trial and make a deal as 
they had the first time around, with maybe a little more leverage on the defense 
side of the table.90  
Furthermore, Martinez does not change the reasons that state trial judges 
may be wary of ordering costly hearings and counsel when they don’t have to, 
particularly where the costs must be borne by the county and not the state.91 In 
many states, where postconviction representation in state trial courts is not 
already delegated to a separate appellate or postconviction defender office, 
judges must enlist appointed counsel from the same pool of attorneys available 
to represent defendants before conviction or on direct appeal, and pay them 
from the same funds. If a state is already having difficulty providing any 
 
 
89. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Roger Moore, supra note 49 (“Most of the time we’ve 
had a [postconviction claim] granted for [ineffectiveness of counsel], the attorney 
abandoned the defendant after trial, never filed a motion for new trial or appeal, or missed 
the date. That’s the majority of the [successful postconviction claims]—someone has messed 
up the appeal process.”); Telephone Interview with Scott Whitney, supra note 51.  
90. King, supra note 10, at 314-16 (detailing the disposition of cases in which federal relief had 
been granted and noting that only one of fourteen cases involved a retrial); Telephone 
Interview with Jay A. Macke, supra note 73 (“[T]he grants of relief are too rare. 
[Prosecutors] don’t even care about federal habeas. When we do get some sort of relief, the 
A.G. will say to the D.A., ‘You should settle this case,’ and they do it.”); see also Anup 
Malani, Habeas Settlements, 92 VA. L. REV. 1, 23, 28 (2006) (noting that habeas settlements 
are “very rare” and “are typically exchanges of habeas claims for sentence reductions”).	
91. Telephone Interview with Edward L. Marshall, supra note 77 (reporting that county 
commissioners keep track of attorney appointment spending by judge, and that “a judge 
who spends a lot of money on appointments will hear about it” and “may get in trouble  
for that the next time he runs for office”); see also David Ovalle, Law Governing  
Legal Fees Unconstitutional, Miami-Dade Judge Says, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 29, 2012, 
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/10/29/3073244/law-governing-legal-fees-unconstitutional 
.html (describing a challenge to a bill that charges appointment overruns to the courts’ 
budgets, and quoting an attorney’s claim that the bill “makes judges think twice about 
paying a lawyer, knowing that he or she has to also think about paying his secretary or 
buying copier paper”); Ken Malkin, Pub. Defender for Bay Cnty., Mich., Testimony Before 
the Michigan Indigent Defense Commission, MICH. CAMPAIGN FOR JUST. (Dec. 16, 2011), 
http://www.michigancampaignforjustice.org/docs/Ken%20Malkin%20indigent%20defense
%20commission%20testimony.docx (stating that whenever a public defender needs an 
investigator or expert witness, she must ask the court for funds, but that “often a judge can 
be more concerned about the fiscal impact on the county than the impact on a client’s 
defense”). 
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counsel at all in its misdemeanor cases, for example,92 adding more 
representation responsibilities in postconviction proceedings is a likely 
nonstarter. An uptick in appointments may even encounter resistance from the 
defender community itself. As an important feature of sustainable indigent 
defense reform, states are struggling to find ways to shrink rather than expand 
the demands on public defenders.93  
Even if state judges decided to safeguard their convictions against federal 
review by appointing counsel in postconviction cases, they could safely restrict 
this strategy to only those petitioners challenging their convictions (not their 
sentences), after a trial (not a plea), and who are serving particularly lengthy 
sentences. The Martinez dissenters’ prediction that states will have no choice 
but to provide counsel in every case is absurd.  
Also farfetched is the opposite prediction: that if federal courts start 
granting relief in more cases, state legislatures will refuse to spend any more 
money on state postconviction review and will just let the federal courts deal 
with it.94 Abandoning state postconviction review would forfeit one of a state’s 
most effective tools for reducing postconviction litigation in federal court: 
delay. States also use their own postconviction remedies to address changes in 
state criminal law, to consider new evidence of innocence, and to facilitate 
quick responses tailored to local criminal justice problems. If there is a flaw in a 
case that is going to require retrial, all would agree it is better to find that out 
sooner rather than later.95 Besides, many state prosecutors prefer their chances 
 
 
92. See, e.g., Erica Hashimoto, Abandoning Misdemeanor Defendants, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 103 
(2012) (collecting and discussing authority documenting the denial of counsel to 
misdemeanor defendants in several states). 
93. One public defender in Maryland, for example, complained that a recent appellate court 
decision, reversed by legislation, which would have required counsel at initial bail hearings, 
would have stretched his office’s resources to the breaking point. See Tricia Bishop, State 
Lawmakers Reverse High Court Ruling on Public Defenders, BALT. SUN, Apr. 13, 2012, 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-04-13/news/bs-md-public-defender-bills-20120413_1 
_high-court-ruling-public-defenders-hearings (quoting a public defender stating that the 
decision “would have decimated the ability to do the work that we already do”); see also Brief 
for the States of Wisconsin et al., supra note 9, at 15-16 (arguing that a right to 
postconviction counsel would “stretch[]” public defender offices “even thinner” and direct 
resources away from trial and direct appeal). 
94. See Brief for the States of Wisconsin et al., supra note 9, at 36 n.22 (urging the Court not to 
“articulate a rule that would encourage a State to curtail an avenue of review that it might 
otherwise make available to its citizens in order to thwart meddling by the federal courts 
that undermine the finality of state court decisions”).  
95. See Freedman, supra note 36, at 298 (noting that “states have sound reasons for not 
abandoning their systems of collateral attack”). 
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before state rather than federal judges.96 
3. Relief 
Finally, even if more state judges do decide to provide counsel and hearings 
to postconviction petitioners, the low grant rates in states where this is already 
common suggest that relief rates would not change. Consider Ohio, where the 
state public defenders have for years taken a uniquely proactive approach to 
postconviction representation in noncapital cases. At each of the state’s three 
intake prisons, a public defender interviews every arriving inmate who was 
convicted after a trial, looking for potential nonrecord claims such as ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel. One supervising defender estimated that only about 
10% of these interviews produce a potential claim that is referred to the office 
for further action, which includes the possible assignment of one of their 
investigators, and review of the trial transcript. Only about 10% of those 
referrals pan out as viable claims to file, yielding a total of about twenty 
petitions per year. Yet almost all of these cherry-picked cases, ably litigated by 
dedicated and experienced defenders, are rejected by the state courts.97  
conclusion: the disconnect between postconviction 
review and indigent defense reform 
Gideon’s promise is that every person accused of a crime will have 
competent representation when he needs it the most—before he is convicted. 
In states still struggling to meet this goal, expanding federal habeas review is 
unlikely to help. Reformers may be getting the message. 
Consider Michigan’s recent experience. A groundbreaking reform shifting 
funding to the state and earmarking millions for indigent defense was 
proposed by an Indigent Defense Advisory Commission appointed by a 
 
 
96. Telephone Interview with Roger Moore, supra note 49 (“Should we get rid of state 
[postconviction review] and just let them go to federal court? No—Tennessee added state 
[postconviction review] so the state can have the first say, and the legislature took that to 
heart. It would be unwise not to have a state ‘buffer.’ The person in the best position to 
review the claim is the trial judge, not some other judge.”). 
97. Telephone Interview with Jay A. Macke, supra note 73. Twenty inmates is approximately 
0.5-2% of the number of inmates committed to Ohio prisons each year after conviction at 
trial. See DRC DataSource Reports—DRC Annual Report, OH. DEP’T OF REHABILITATION & 
CORRECTION, http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/Reports/reports2.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) 
(providing commitment data from 2001 to 2011). 
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Republican governor and approved by the Republican-controlled House last 
fall.98 Prosecutors argued that the tiny number of cases in which state or federal 
courts found ineffective assistance, and the fact that most involved retained 
counsel, showed that any problem with the quality of indigent defense in 
Michigan is not systemic.99 For their part, reform advocates did not rely on an 
earlier (and somewhat implausible) claim that 50 Strickland wins in over 25 
years was itself proof of a serious crisis.100 Instead, they pitched to the 
Commission an argument about fiscal responsibility that depended upon the 
inability of postconviction review to identify bad lawyering. They argued that 
postconviction relief is no measure of the extent of the problem, but that other 
evidence is: the rate at which errors in sentencing are established on appeal and 
the number of exonerees freed after unsuccessfully claiming ineffective 
assistance. Millions of dollars are wasted imprisoning those who would not be 
in prison at all or who would have received shorter sentences if they had 
received competent representation, the reformers maintained.101  
With litigation lurking over its shoulder,102 Michigan’s Commission 
agreed. “[I]neffective assistance of trial counsel claims . . . are not necessarily 
the only indicator of a well-functioning system,” the Commission reported. 
“The current delivery of indigent defense results in a public defense system 
that is too often subject to errors at the trial level, and at its worst, results in a 
 
 
98. Michigan House OKs Overhaul of Indigent Defense, CBS DETROIT, Nov. 8, 2012, 
http://detroit.cbslocal.com/2012/11/08/michigan-house-oks-overhaul-of-indigent-defense. 
The bill is expected to be taken up by the Michigan Senate in 2013. See David Carroll, The 
Clock Runs Out on Michigan Reform for This Year, PLEADING THE SIXTH (Dec. 19, 2012), 
http://sixthamendment.org/?p=1081. 
99. Letter from Joel D. McGormley, supra note 10.  
100. See Representation of Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases: A Constitutional Crisis in Michigan 
and Other States? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 108, 120 (2009) (statement of Dawn Van Hoek, Dir., 
Mich. State Appellate Defender Office) [hereinafter Van Hoek Testimony]. 
101. See, e.g., Memorandum from Dawn Van Hoek, supra note 10; William Fleener, Staff Att’y, 
Cooley Innocence Project, Testimony to the Indigent Defense Advisory Commission, MICH. 
CAMPAIGN FOR JUST. (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.michigancampaignforjustice.org/docs 
/Fleener%20Testimony%20to%20the%20Indigent%20Defense%20Advisory%20Commissio
n%20final.doc. 
102. See Duncan v. State, No. 307790 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2011) (alleging that the state had 
abdicated its constitutional and statutory responsibility by delegating responsibility for 
indigent defense to individual counties and failing to fund or provide oversight for such 
services).  
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wrongful conviction.”103 No one seemed interested in improving 
postconviction review for IATC claims. Indeed, defenders argued that better 
representation at trial could reduce the high cost of postconviction review.104 If 
Michigan’s experience is any guide, lasting structural reform in indigent 
defense may gain better traction if the rate of postconviction relief for IATC 
claims remains negligible and petitioners continue to lose. 
In Michigan, as elsewhere, disagreement about the extent of constitutional 
compliance and the efficacy of postconviction review is rooted in a fundamental 
dispute about what the Sixth Amendment requires. Does it guarantee 
reasonably competent representation, but condition relief upon a finding of 
prejudice? Or does it instead guarantee, as the Court has explained,105 only an 
attorney who does not make prejudicial mistakes? Redefining the right to 
effective assistance as independent from its impact on the outcome of 
proceedings would probably make violations easier to detect. But this approach 
poses at least two problems: the list of acts or omissions that would necessarily 
be against the best interests of any client in any case would be extremely 
short;106 and the inherent weaknesses of enforcement through postconviction 
review would remain.  
Courts could order legislatures to fund more sweeping system-wide reform 
if the Sixth Amendment were interpreted to prohibit deficiencies in delivery 
systems that pose a high probability of compromising effective assistance—a 
claim for which “existing law,” as Professor William Stuntz lamented fifteen 
 
 
103. Report of the Michigan Advisory Commission on Indigent Defense, MICH. ADVISORY 
COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEF. 8 (June 22, 2012), http://www.michigan.gov/documents 
/snyder/Indigent_Defense_Advisory_Comm_Rpt_390212_7.pdf. 
104. Van Hoek Testimony, supra note 100, at 120; Memorandum from Dawn Van Hoek, supra 
note 10, at 5. The same argument has been made in other states as support for funding 
indigent defense. See, e.g., PDSC Plan, supra note 63. 
105. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006) (“The requirement that 
a defendant show prejudice in effective representation cases arises from the very nature of 
the specific element of the right to counsel at issue there—effective (not mistake-free) 
representation. Counsel cannot be ‘ineffective’ unless his mistakes have harmed the defense 
(or, at least, unless it is reasonably likely that they have). Thus, a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective representation is not ‘complete’ until the defendant is 
prejudiced.”); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2001) (“[D]efects in assistance that 
have no probable effect upon the [case’s] outcome do not establish a constitutional 
violation.”). 
106. E.g., William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal 
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 20-21 (1997) (noting the difficulty of “separat[ing] low-activity but 
good representation from laziness or incompetence”).	
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years ago, still “leaves no room.”107 Litigation such as the ongoing class action 
case in Michigan is attempting to move courts in this direction.108 But we are a 
long way from consensus about what deficiencies are most salient, or when 
they become constitutionally intolerable when applied to defenders’ offices, to 
appointed counsel, or, most perplexing of all, to retained counsel.  
Fortunately, the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the indigent defendant’s 
right to counsel in state criminal cases is not grounded in originalist 
interpretations of the Sixth Amendment, and has instead looked to evolving 
standards. Gideon itself abandoned a case-by-case approach to the provision of 
counsel to indigents in felony cases only after most of the states had already 
proven the feasibility of compliance with a blanket rule. In the decades to 
come, lower courts, state legislatures, or even voters109 might once again move 
out ahead of the Court, toward a rough consensus about the conditions that so 
disable the provision of effective assistance to those accused in our “system of 
pleas”110 that a Sixth Amendment violation should be presumed. Along the 
way, system-wide litigation might succeed in grabbing state legislators’ 
attention, but case-by-case postconviction review under the unforgiving 
Strickland standard never will. 
 
 
 
107. Id. at 21.  
108. See Duncan v. State, No. 307790 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2011); see generally Cara H. 
Drinan, Lafler and Frye: Good News for Public Defense Litigation, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 138, 
138-39 (2012) (discussing recent litigation in the Supreme Court on the right to counsel); 
Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Unintended Consequences: The Impact of the Court’s Recent Cases on 
Structural Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 106 (2012) (same). 	
109. See Milan Simonich, Constitutional Amendment 5 Would Establish Public Defender Department, 
LAS CRUCES SUN-NEWS (N.M), Oct. 8, 2012, http://www.lcsun-news.com/ci_21719567 
/las_cruces-financial (describing an amendment to increase the independence of the state 
public defender, which ultimately passed with 62% of the vote). 
110. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012). 
